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H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.: Another
Contribution To RICO Confusion
RICO's Pattern Element
The United States Supreme Court recently had the opportunity to
clarify an area of the law which has plagued the entire judicial system
with confusion and inconsistency. Under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968, one must
engage in a "pattern of racketeering activity" in order to violate the
statute.' The statute explicitly defines what is meant by racketeering
activity.2 It does not, however, clearly explain what is meant by a
"pattern of racketeering activity." While a pattern is defined in the
statute as "requir[ing] at least two acts of racketeering activity" within
a ten year period,3 the legislative history of RICO makes it clear that
something more is needed to constitute a pattern. The principal sponsor
of the statute stated that "proof of two acts of racketeering activity,
without more, does not establish a pattern." ' 4 Unfortunately, neither the
sponsor nor the other drafters elaborated on what those additional
requirements might be.
The Supreme Court in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone
Co.5 held that at least two predicate acts must have a relationship
between them and be continuous or have a threat of continuing activity
in order to form a pattern and that multiple schemes need not be
alleged. The Court stated that "[i]t is this factor of continuity plus
relationship which combines to produce a pattern." '6 Whether the Su-
© Copyright 1990, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
2. Id. at § 1961(1). This section provides:
(1) "racketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving murder,
kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene
matter, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable
under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; (B)
any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18,
United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery) . . . section 1341 (relating
to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud) ....
3. Id. at § 1961(5). This section provides that a 'pattern of racketeering activity'
requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective
date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period
of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity."
4. 116 Cong. Rec. 18940 (1970) (statement of Sen. McClellan).
5. 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989).
6. Id. at 2900 (quoting S. Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969)).
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preme Court's decision in H.J. Inc. makes RICO any less confusing
and more consistent than it has been in the past is the subject of this
note.
The Court's Opinion
The dispute in H.J. Inc. arose from allegations that Northwestern
Bell attempted to persuade members of the Minnesota Public Utilities
Commission (MPUC) to perform their duties in a manner favorable to
the telephone company. The petitioners, customers of Northwestern Bell,
claimed that the telephone company, through acts of bribery including
cash payments made to commissioners, negotiations for future employ-
ment, and payments for entertainment, caused the MPUC to approve
rates for the company which were unfair and unreasonable. The peti-
tioners raised four claims under section 1962 of RICO that Northwestern
Bell allegedly violated. 7 The District Court, however, dismissed the com-
7. Petitioners claim: Section 1962(a) was violated when Northwestern Bell used income
obtained from a pattern of racketeering activity consisting of predicate acts of bribery in
its business, an interstate enterprise.
Section 1962(b) was violated by respondents obtaining an interest or control in the
MPUC, also an interstate enterprise, through the same pattern of racketeering activity.
Section 1962(c) was violated by respondents' affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity.
Section 1962(d) was violated by respondents' conspiring together to violate § 1962
(a), (b), and (c).
Section 1962 provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived,
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection
of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal within
the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly
or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in
acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise
which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce. A purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of in-
vestment, and without the intention of controlling or participating in the control
of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this
subsection if the securities of the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of
his immediate family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern or racketeering
activity or the collection of an unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount
in the aggregate to one percent of the outstanding securities of any one class,
and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or more
directors or the issuer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering
activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly
or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in,
or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
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plaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted,8
based upon the holding of the Eighth Circuit in Superior Oil Co. v.
Fulmer9 that a pattern of racketeering activity required more than one
continuing scheme.' 0 The District Court in H.J. Inc. adopted the Fulmer
court's interpretation of the continuity plus relationship requirement,'
finding that only one scheme alleged in the case was not enough to
meet the continuity requisite. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision dismissing the petitioners'
complaint .12
The Supreme Court reversed both lower courts, finding that it was
possible that the petitioners had stated a claim under RICO. Because
the petitioners alleged numerous acts of bribery, which is one of the
racketeering activities set out in RICO,' 3 the complaint did contain at
least two predicate acts which are required to form a pattern. It was
the Court's view that the petitioners might also have been able to meet
the continuity plus relationship requirement. The relationship factor
might be satisfied by the allegation that all the acts of bribery took
place for the sole purpose of influencing the Commissioners of MPUC
to grant unfair and unreasonable rates to Northwestern Bell. The con-
tinuity factor might be satisfied by the allegation of frequent racketeering
activity over a six-year period. Alternatively, a threat of continuing
activity might be established if it could be shown "that the alleged
bribes were a regular way of conducting Northwestern Bell's ongoing
business."'' 4 Since it appeared that a sufficient cause of action was stated,
the Court remanded the case to the lower court.
Analysis of the Decision
The H.J. Inc. opinion, however, does not clearly express what will
constitute a pattern under RICO. Instead, the Court acknowledges that
commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of
such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection
of unlawful debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions
of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988).
8. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 648 F. Supp. 419 (D. Minn. 1986).
9. Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1985).
10. Id. at 257. This court felt that many acts which lead to one scheme are not a
pattern, but that multiple schemes are required to form a pattern.
11. This requirement was first enunciated by the Supreme Court in Sedima, S.P.R.L.
v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14, 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3285 n.14 (1985) (quoting S.
Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969)).
12. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 829 F.2d 648 (8th Cir. 1987).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988). See supra note 2.
14. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2906 (1989).
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continuity plus relationship may be proved in a variety of ways and
then merely lists a few examples. While holding that a pattern requires
continuity plus relationship may sound as though it benefits the prac-
titioner, it actually adds nothing more to the understanding of a pattern
than did Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 5 a prior RICO case
considered by the Supreme Court. Sedima did not turn on the definition
of "pattern of racketeering activity" or the determination of whether
the predicate acts constituted a pattern. The focus of Sedima was that
to proceed in a civil RICO action there is no need that the defendant
have been convicted of a predicate act of a RICO violation and that
the plaintiff need not establish a "racketeering injury" separate from
the injury of the predicate acts. In explaining the meaning of the pattern
requirement of a violation of § 1962(c),16 the Court articulated a test
for finding a pattern, but buried it in a footnote."1 The Sedima Court's
basis for finding that a pattern is formed only when continuity plus
relationship exists between the predicate acts was in the legislative history
of RICO. The history explicitly states that two predicate acts alone do
not form a pattern. The Senate Report provides that "[iut is this factor
15. Sedima, 473 U.S. 479, 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
16. See supra note 7.
17. Footnote fourteen provides:
As many commentators have pointed out, the definition of a "pattern of
racketeering activity" differs from the other provisions in § 1961 in that it
states that a pattern "requires at least two acts of racketeering activity," §
1961(5) (emphasis added), not that it "means" two such acts. The implication
is that while two acts are necessary, they may not be sufficient. Indeed, in
common parlance two of anything do not generally form a "pattern." The
legislative history supports the view that two isolated acts of racketeering activity
do not constitute a pattern. As the Senate Report explained: "The target of
[RICO] is thus not sporadic activity. The infiltration of legitimate business
normally requires more than one racketeering activity and the threat of continuing
activity to be effective. It is this factor of continuity plus relationship which
combines to produce a pattern." (S.Rep.No. 91-617, p. 158 (1969) (emphasis
added).) Similarly, the sponsor of the Senate bill, after quoting this portion of
the Report, pointed out to his colleagues that "[tihe term 'pattern' itself requires
the showing of a relationship.... So, therefore, proof of two acts of rack-
eteering activity, without more, does not establish a pattern...." 116 Cong.Rec.
18940 (1970) (statement of Sen. McClellan). See also id., at 35193 (statement
of Rep. Poff) (RICO "not aimed at the isolated offender"); House Hearings,
at 665. Significantly, in defining "pattern" in a later provision of the same
bill, Congress was more enlightening: "[C]riminal conduct forms a pattern if
it embraces criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes, results, par-
ticipants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by
distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events. 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e).
This language may be useful in interpreting other sections of the Act.
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14, 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3285 n.14
(1985) (quoting S. Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 158 (1969)). Cf. Jannelli v.
United States, 420 U.S. 770, 789, 95 S. Ct. 1284, 1295, 43 L.Ed.2d 616 (1975).
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of continuity plus relationship which combines to produce a pattern ' 8
and also provides that "sporadic activity"' 19 is not the target of RICO.
The majority in H.J. Inc. based its decision on the footnote in
Sedima and on the legislative history contained in the footnote. There
are distinct problems, however, in using the language of Sedima to
establish the definition of a pattern in H.J. Inc. The history of RICO
must be understood in order to comprehend the difficulties involved.
History of the Pattern Requirement
Controversy has surrounded RICO since its passage in 1970 as part
of the Organized Crime Control Act.20 The statute was enacted as a
way to fight organized crime after Congress determined this type of
criminal activity was threatening the nation's economic system. 21 The
congressional purpose of RICO was to eliminate organized crime in the
United States. 2  In order to accomplish this goal, RICO provides for
both civil and criminal penalties. 23 The severity of the civil penalty,
which provides for treble damages as well as attorney's fees, 24 has been
the subject of much debate. Because of the possibility of such a tre-
mendous award, potential for abusing the statute exists. As a result,
many have argued for the limitation of the statute by narrowly construing
the pattern element to require proof of a link to organized crime.
Although this argument was urged by the amici 25 in H.J. Inc. ,26 the
18. S. Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 158 (1969) (emphasis added).
19. Id.
20. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (OCCA), Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat.
922 (1970).
21. Congress established in its statement of findings and purpose:
(1) organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated, diversified,
and widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from America's
economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud, and corruption;
... (4) organized crime activities in the United States weaken the stability of
the Nation's economic system, harm innocent investors and competing organi-
zations, interfere with free competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign
commerce, threaten the domestic security, and undermine the general welfare
of the Nation and its citizens. ...
Id. at 922-23.
22. Id. at 923. Congress stated that the purpose of the Act is: "to seek the eradication
of organized crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-
gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced
sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in
organized crime."
23. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963-1964 (1988).
24. Id. at § 1964(c).
25. Black's Law Dictionary 75 (5th ed. 1979) defines amicus curiae as "[a] person
with strong interest in or views on the subject matter of an action [who] may petition
the court for permission to file a brief, ostensibly on behalf of a party but actually to
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Court refused to find that RICO was limited to organized crime. 27 The
Court noted that Congress used broad concepts so the statute could
apply to other situations besides organized crime.28
The Sedima decision discussed this continuing controversy by noting
that since RICO was enacted there has been concern that the statute
"provided too easy a weapon against 'innocent businessmen'2 9 . . . and
would be prone to abuse .. ."30 Despite the fact that private civil actions
under RICO are being brought mostly against the everyday businessman
instead of the stereotypical gangster,3' the Sedima court did not think
that the statute was ambiguous. The Supreme Court in Sedima made
it clear that even though RICO has developed into something more than
the drafters may have envisioned, if a defect exists, it "is inherent in
the statute as written, and its correction must lie with Congress." 'a2
Therefore, in response to those who argue that RICO is too broad, the
Court replied: "The 'extraordinary' uses to which civil RICO has been
put appear to be primarily the result of the breadth of the predicate
offenses, in particular the inclusion of wire, mail, and securities fraud,
and the failure of Congress and the courts to develop a meaningful
concept of 'pattern."' ' 33
Inconsistency in the Judicial System After Sedima
After Sedima, lower courts have attempted to develop a "meaningful
concept of pattern" as they believed the Court had directed them to
do. Different circuits, however, have adopted inconsistent tests. Uncer-
tainty still existed concerning whether to construe the pattern element
suggest a rationale consistent with its own views." Those involved here were the Washington
Legal Foundation, the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organ-
izations, the National Association of Manufacturers, and the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants.
26. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2902-03 (1989).
27. Id. at 2905.
28. Id.
29. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 498, 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3286 (1985)
(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 187 (1970)).
30. Id., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3286 (1985) (referring to 116 Cong. Rec. 35342 (1970)).
31. The Sedima court provides in note 16:
The ABA Task Force found that of the 270 known civil RICO cases at the
trial court level, 40% involved securities fraud, 37% common law fraud in a
commercial or business setting, and only 9% "allegations of criminal activity
of a type generally associated with professional criminals." ABA Report, at 55-
56. Another survey of 132 published decisions found that 57 involved securities
transactions and 38 commercial and contract disputes, while no other category
made it into double figures ....
Id., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3286 n.16 (1985).
32. Id. at 499, 105 S. Ct. at 3286-87.
33. Id. at 500, 105 S. Ct. at 3287.
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broadly, so as to eliminate all organized crime possible, or narrowly,
so as to avoid the abuse of RICO. Predictably, since some circuits
wished to curtail civil RICO actions and some did not, it was interpreted
at both ends of the spectrum.
The most restrictive view was utilized by the Eighth Circuit, the
same circuit in which H.J. Inc. arose. Under that court's interpretation
of continuity plus relationship, only multiple schemes, and not multiple
predicate acts which form only one single scheme, constitute a pattern.
Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer3" is a good example of this approach. The
oil company brought actions for wrongful conversion against Fulmer,
claiming that over a period of time Fulmer fraudulently took gas from
the pipeline he was to oversee. Employing a restrictive view of a pattern,
the appellate court found that Superior Oil had alleged only one con-
tinuing scheme-to convert gas from the pipeline-despite the number
of acts constituting the offense. In order to satisfy the continuity plus
relationship requirement, the plaintiff had to prove multiple schemes,
not just multiple acts leading up to one big scheme. Thus, Superior Oil
did not state a RICO claim since no pattern existed. This approach
severely limits RICO actions.
A second approach toward interpreting Sedima was to define a
pattern broadly, as was done before that opinion was rendered. Under
pre-Sedima law many circuits required merely two predicate acts in order
to form a pattern." The Fifth Circuit employed this approach in R.A.G.S.
Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt.16 R.A.G.S. complained that the defendant mailed
false invoices twice in an attempt to defraud the company on the repair
of certain equipment. The appellate court found that because the two
acts of mail fraud were related, a pattern was sufficiently established
to support a RICO claim. The court stated that Sedima bars only two
isolated acts from forming a pattern, not two related ones.3 7 This ap-
proach broadens RICO to allow only two related acts to be sufficient
to constitute a pattern.
A third test adopted after Sedima fell somewhere between these two
approaches. A few circuits adopted a flexible test relying on multiple
factors whereby satisfaction of the continuity plus relationship require-
ment is dependent upon the facts of each case. For example, in Bar-
34. Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1986).
35. United States V. Jennings, 842 F.2d 159, 163 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v.
lanniello, 808 F.2d 184, 190 (2d Cir. 1986) cert. denied 483 U.S. 1006, 107 S. Ct. 3230
(1987) (explaining Sedima's pattern requirement as dictum); R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc. v.
Hyatt, 774 F.2d 1350, 1355 (5th Cir. 1985) (two predicate acts may form a pattern).
36. R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc., 774 F.2d. 1350 (5th Cir. 1985).
37. Id. at 1355. The Court stated: "The Supreme Court in Sedima implied that two
'isolated' acts would not constitute a pattern. Id. In this case, however, the alleged acts
of mail fraud are related."
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ticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank/First National State3" the Third Circuit
found that a scheme involving several individuals and two entities, a
partnership and a bank, who made repeated misrepresentations to over
twenty investors constituted a "pattern" under the ordinary meaning of
the word. The factors used to determine that a pattern existed were
"the number of unlawful acts, the length of time over which the acts
were committed, the similarity of the acts, the number of victims, the
number of perpetrators, and the character of the unlawful activity." 3 9
This case rejected the concept that racketeering acts of a single scheme
constitute a pattern only if the scheme is likely to be ongoing, in favor
of a case-by-case analysis to determine the continuity element. 0
Because of the great disparity among the lower courts in determining
what constituted a pattern, the Supreme Court decided to hear H.J.
Inc. in an effort to resolve this conflict.
What H.J. Inc. Actually Says
H.J. Inc. makes it clear that for a plaintiff to establish a pattern
of racketeering activity in a RICO claim he must at least prove two
predicate acts and continuity plus relationship of those two acts. There-
fore, the acts must be related and continuous or threaten continuity.4'
Because this test had not been applied uniformly in the past, the Supreme
Court attempted to expand upon what it had said earlier in Sedima so
that lower courts would have some guidance in their decision-making.
Despite all the debate on whether the pattern element should be
construed narrowly in order to eliminate the abuse of RICO, the Court
evidently will continue to interpret a pattern broadly in accord with the
expansive concepts and terms contained in the statute.4 2 If the statute
is being used in a different manner than the drafters intended, it is
because the language is overly broad. It is up to Congress to limit the
statute.43 Otherwise, the Court will continue to construe RICO as written-
expansively.
In giving meaning to the continuity plus relationship element, the
Court began with what it perceived to be the easier term to define:
relationship. It simply adopted the requirements of another title of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (OCCA)." Title X, which is the
38. 832 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1987).
39. Id. at 39.
40. Id.
41. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2900 (1989).
42. Id. at 2899 (citing Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 21, 104 S. Ct. 296,
299 (1983).
43. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499, 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3286-87
(1985).
44. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (OCCA), Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat.
922 (1970), of which RICO formed Title IX.
1226 [Vol. 50
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Dangerous Special Offender Sentencing Act, defines a pattern "solely
in terms of the relationship of the defendant's criminal acts one to
another: 'criminal conduct forms a pattern if it embraces criminal acts
that have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or
methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing
characteristics and are not isolated events."' 45 The Court did not think
Congress intended to restrict the relationship requirement of RICO's
pattern element any more than was necessary. 6 This part of the test
poses little problem. Courts have used similar definitions in the past
which produced analogous results. 47
The more difficult task was to give meaning to continuity. The
Court determined that to prove continuity the racketeering activity must
be shown to be continuous or have a threat of becoming continuous.
In other words, the alleged racketeering activity may have been contin-
uous and be completed before trial, or it may pose a threat of continuity,
indicating that it is ongoing. The alleged activity does not have to be
open-ended, which means that the plaintiff does not always have to
prove the activity will continue in the future. If the activity was con-
tinuous in the past and is completed by trial, that is sufficient to establish
continuity. The plaintiff does not have to wait until the activity is
completed in order to bring an action. However, the majority did
determine that an essential factor to establishing continuity is time. The
related predicate acts must have taken place over a "substantial period
of time." ' 4 The Court explained that because long-term criminal conduct
was the focus of RICO, showing predicate acts which extend over only
a few weeks or months do not satisfy the continuity requirement.4 9 If
the RICO action is brought before continuity can be established, then
a threat of continuity must be demonstrated.50
Because these determinations are factually based, the Court listed
several examples to guide lower courts in their decision-making. The
first of these is that a pattern is definitely formed if the related predicate
acts themselves constitute a clear threat of long-term racketeering activity.
By way of illustration the Court stated:
Suppose a hoodlum were to sell "insurance" to a neighborhood's
storekeepers to cover them against breakage of their windows,
telling his victims he would be reappearing each month to collect
the "premium" that would continue their "coverage." Though
45. H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2901 (1989) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1988)).
46. Id. at 2901.
47. D. Smith & T. Reed, Civil RICO 4.03 at 4-21 (1990).
48. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2902 (1989).
49. Id.
50. Id. (citing S. Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969)).
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the number of related predicates involved may be small and
they may occur close together in time, the racketeering acts
themselves include a specific threat of repetition extending in-
definitely into the future, and thus supply the requisite threat
of continuity."'
A second example is "by showing that the predicate acts or offenses
are part of an ongoing entity's regular way of doing business." 2 There-
fore, continuity exists when the predicate acts are part of a long-term
association which exists for criminal purposes. Although not clearly
explained by the Court, apparently a business which exists for criminal
purposes would fit into this category. An example is a business that
smuggles drugs or extorts money. A third example is when "the pred-
icates are a regular way of conducting defendant's ongoing legitimate
business (in the sense that it is not a business that exists for criminal
purposes), or of conducting or participating in an ongoing and legitimate
RICO 'enterprise."' 5 3 This is best illustrated by one who has a legitimate
business which is run by continually committing mail or wire fraud
when dealing with customers. Of course, all of these illustrations must
be over a "substantial period of time" to qualify as a pattern.
Criticisms in the Concurring Opinion
Although the intention of the majority in H.J. Inc. in providing
examples was to expand on the Sedima footnote and provide guidance
to the lower courts, the concurrence felt that the illustrations may be
counterproductive.
Four justices concurred in the view that nothing supports the prop-
osition that predicate acts which make up only a single scheme are never
sufficient to satisfy the pattern element under RICO. 4 They disagreed,
however, with the reasoning of the majority. Believing that the majority's
opinion did nothing to make the statute less confusing than before its
decision, Justice Scalia stated that defining a pattern as "continuity plus
relationship" for the lower courts was "about as helpful to the conduct
of their affairs as 'life is a fountain.'
'55
The concurrence believed that the majority falsely perceived the
relatedness requirement as conceptually simple, when in fact the majority
had to pull the definition from another title.5 6 Normally when an ex-
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Justice Scalia, The Chief Justice, Justice O'Connor, and Justice Kennedy concurred
in the opinion.
55. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2907 (1989).
56. Id. The definition was taken from 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1988) which is Title X,
the Dangerous Special Offender Sentencing Act.
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pression is provided in one section of a statute and omitted from a
separate section of the Act, the omission is viewed as an intentional
means of not having the expression apply to the section in which the
words do not appear.17 Despite this jurisprudential rule and the criticism
by the concurrence, lower courts have had no problem deciding which
predicate acts are related. Section 3575(e) of Title X, from which the
majority drew the relatedness definition, is broad enough that the lower
courts can fit almost anything under it. After Sedima, lower courts
virtually ignored the relatedness element, paying attention instead to
continuity. Those cases not addressing the relatedness issue had little
difficulty finding a sufficient relationship between the predicate acts. 8
Even if the majority's definition of relatedness provides a sufficient
test, the concurrence disagreed with the Court's explanation of the
continuity requirement. This disagreement stems from the requirement
that the alleged activity must occur over a "substantial period of time."
The Court explicitly rejected those predicate acts which last only a few
weeks or months with no threat of continuing activity as sufficient to
constitute the pattern requirement. As Justice Scalia pointed out, it is
absurd to allow criminals who commit racketeering acts for a whole
week or month and then disband (so no threat of continuity exists) to
be unreachable under the RICO statute. Essentially, then, criminal con-
duct which constitutes racketeering activity is "free, as far as RICO is
concerned" 5 9 for at least a few months.
The majority disagreed with the position of those concurring on the
"substantial period" requirement. 6° It claimed that short periods of
criminal conduct were not meant to be covered by RICO when the
statute was drafted. Without citing any support for this proposition,
the majority stated that Congress' intention that continuity be demon-
strated to form a RICO pattern meant RICO should "reach activities
that amount to or threaten long-term criminal activity." 6 1
The ordinary meaning of continuity is "the state or quality of being
uninterrupted in sequence or succession, or in essence or idea; con-
nectedness, coherence, unbrokenness. ' 62 This definition does not suggest
that the activity must be long-term to be continuous. Accordingly,
conduct which is repeated over a short period of time could be con-
tinuous. Hence, because the majority cites no legislative authority for
this definition of continuity, nor does its definition comport with the
ordinary meaning of the word, defining continuous as long-term is not
57. Id. (citing Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23, 104 S. Ct. 296, 300 (1983)).
58. D. Smith & T. Reed, Civil RICO 4.03 at 4-21 (1990).
59. H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2908.
60. Id. at 2902 n.4.
61. Id.
62. 3 Oxford English Dictionary 830 (2d ed. 1989).
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well-founded. Congress also may have intended short-term, continuous
activity to be covered by RICO, inasmuch as the Congressional reports
do not contain any restriction to long-term activity. Legislative history
does not support the proposition that criminals committing racketeering
activity over a short period of time should be permitted to escape the
punishment of RICO.
Aside from the definitional problems with relatedness and continuity,
the concurring opinion found the examples of continuity given by the
majority so vague as to add nothing to the understanding of the concept.
The examples, particularly the last two, may make it even more difficult
for one to ascertain whether his activity falls within the scope of RICO.
These examples state that continuity exists when "the predicates can be
attributed to a defendant operating as part of a long-term association
that exists for criminal purposes," and when "the predicates are a regular
way of conducting defendant;s ongoing legitimate business." 63 Both may
be impossible to apply by the courts. It is possible that the judicial
system will get trapped in defining a "regular way of doing business." 64
If only two predicate acts are alleged, it will be very difficult for a
court to find that these contain regularity sufficient to constitute con-
tinuity. The result would be to increase the minimum number of predicate
acts required under RICO to a number that courts find "regular." This
would be contrary to the statute which only requires a minimum of two
predicate acts. The courts may also become entangled in determining
which associations have existed long enough to be characterized as "long-
term" and which exist for criminal purposes. Although these are only
examples, the practical application of them may become so obscured in
defining what exactly is covered in each one that the usefulness of the
illustrations is abrogated.
The concurring justices also expressed concern as to the constitu-
tionality of RICO should such an attack arise. Because the statute
contains criminal applications, its civil applications must have the same
degree of certainty that is required of criminal laws. 65 The RICO statute
contains severe civil and criminal penalties. In a civil RICO case the
plaintiff is allowed attorney fees, costs, and treble damages, in addition
to branding his opponent as a racketeer. These stringent penalties have
resulted in many debates over whether to construe the statute narrowly,
making it difficult to prove, or broadly, allowing abuse of the statute
by the unscrupulous or by innocent and legitimate businessmen. The
concurrence did not believe that H.J. Inc. makes RICO more certain;
63. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2902 (1989).
64. Id. (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 2909 (citing FCC v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S. 284, 296, 74
S. Ct. 593, 600 (1954)).
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hence, the Court may have lost an opportunity to clarify RICO before
a real constitutional attack arises because of its vagueness.
While the concurrence admitted that it did not have a better solution
to this seemingly impossible definition, it was unable to accept that this
latest "guidance" to the lower courts will help the courts at all. The
majority's decision, the concurrence believed, will not create a situation
that will unify the judicial system any more than the Sedima decision
did. The only significant contribution the concurrence perceived was
that it is now clear RICO may be violated even when only a "threat
of continuity" exists and a single episode of racketeering activity may
constitute a cause of action under RICO.
Future of a Pattern
While the majority rejected two of the methods which have developed
since Sedima, that is, the restrictive multiple schemes approach and the
broad approach requiring only two predicate acts, no mention was made
about the intermediate multiple factor approach. It is unclear why the
Court explicitly addressed two methods without even mentioning the
third one, but the Court's silence could be construed as an implicit
recommendation of the flexible approach.
This intermediate flexible approach calls for analysis of many factors,
none of which is determinative. Rather, all of the particular facts of
each case are taken into account in deciding if the pattern requirement
is met. This allows the lower courts flexibility in determining who has
violated RICO. The first court of appeals to adopt the multiple factor
approach was the Seventh Circuit in the decision of Morgan v. Bank
of Waukegan.6 In this case, the court favored a balancing of continuity
plus relationship, reasoning that "[tlo focus excessively on either con-
tinuity or relationship alone effectively negates the remaining prong. '67
The court proposed that the factors needed to determine whether pred-
icate acts satisfy the continuity plus relationship requirement include
"the number and variety of predicate acts and the length of time over
which they were committed, the number of victims, the presence of
separate schemes and the occurrence of distinct injuries. '6 Applying
these factors it was found that several acts of mail fraud occurring over
several years relating to two foreclosure sales were sufficient to establish
a pattern. Hence, Morgan espoused an analysis which was dependent
on all the facts and circumstances of each case while not relying on
any one factor. 69
66. Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970 (7th Cir. 1986).
67. Id. at 975.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 975-76.
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The Third Circuit also used a flexible approach in Barticheck v.
Fidelity Union Bank/First Nat. State to decide that a pattern existed.
As stated earlier, the relevant factors in the court's determination in-
cluded "the number of unlawful acts, the length of time over which
the acts were committed, the similarity of the acts, the number of
victims, the number of perpetrators, and the character of the unlawful
activity."" ° In Barticheck, the court found that the number of victims
was critical in finding a pattern existed where several individuals and
two entities made repeated misrepresentations to over twenty investors. 7 '
The Third Circuit has utilized this approach in several other cases. In
Rose v. Bartle72 the court viewed several factors to decide that a RICO
claim had been established. Those factors were that there were two
perpetrators, four victims, six months of activity and allegations of
bribery and extortion, with none of these being dispositive. 71 In Saporito
v. Combustion Engineering Inc. ,4 the court applied the flexible approach
to find that numerous inducements by the company's officers to retire
made to at least thirty-two employees over a prolonged period of time
were sufficient to constitute a pattern of racketeering activity.
This approach has also been used by the Third Circuit to find that
a pattern did not exist. For example, Marshall-Silver Construction Co.
v. MendeP5 involved an engineering firm, its officers, and a law firm
which filed a petition to involuntarily bankrupt a general contractor and
contacted the press with this information. Because the press reported
that the contractor was bankrupt, his business was destroyed. The court
found that no pattern existed since this was only a single victim, a
single injury, a short-lived scheme with no threat of continuing and
involved only two perpetrators.
There are several reasons why th6 judicial system should apply the
flexible test to the pattern element of RICO. First, as evidenced by
these cases, the multiple factor test allows the court to examine all of
the factors surrounding the allegations to decide if a pattern has been
established. It also allows the courts the chance to apply RICO as it
was intended. The flexible approach is not overly broad nor is it too
narrow. It permits both plaintiff and defendant the chance to prevail
after the facts are set forth. The restrictive approach practically eliminates
the occasion for the plaintiff to successfully state a RICO cause of
70. Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank/First Nat'l State, 832 F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir.
1987).
71. D. Smith & T. Reed, Civil RICO 4.04 at 4-26.7 (1990).
72. Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1989).
73. Id. at 365-66.
74. Saporito v. Combustion Engineering Inc., 843 F.2d 666, 678 (3d Cir. 1988).
75. 835 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1987), aff'd, 894 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1990). (In light of H.J.
Inc., the RICO claim was dismissed since it did not reflect long-term activity or threaten
future conduct.)
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action, while the expansive approach does the opposite, exposing to
RICO liability an overly broad range of defendants. The multiple factor
interpretation of a pattern eliminates rigidity in deciding what activity
falls into a pattern. Because of this flexibility, the margin of error will
be reduced and effectiveness will be restored to RICO. Circuits, such
as the Eighth, will not be able to automatically deny a RICO claim
simply because the illegal acts involved only one scheme. The flexible
approach will force them to weigh all the factors of the case, none of
which is dispositive. At the same time, circuits, such as the Fifth, will
weigh all the factors without automatically granting RICO relief simply
on the basis of two predicate acts.
Another reason the flexible test would be better is because it satisfies
the continuity plus relationship requirement of H.J. Inc. The district
court simply uses the various factors to determine if the predicate acts
are continuous and related. It permits the courts to deal with the
multitude of different circumstances which may arise. It also warns
violators that the totality of their actions will be taken into account in
determining the continuity and relationship of the predicate acts. The
flexible test eliminates the possibility that those who commit racketeering
activities for only a few weeks or a few months could escape RICO's
reach.
The multiple factor approach is favorable because it does not lead
to the complexities associated with defining terms and illustrations for
every conceivable situation that may arise. As evidenced by the H.J.
Inc. case, the words used to define a concept must themselves be defined.
The examples given to interpret the new definition may also require
explanation. It is a vicious cycle that only obscures the meaning of the
original term which was to be defined. It results in the original term
being construed in a manner never intended by the drafters.
The Supreme Court did not reject the multiple factor test as it did
the other tests which were being applied to the pattern element. Con-
sequently, H.J. Inc. may be interpreted as encouraging the use of the
multiple factor approach. The decision contains several references to
flexibility based upon the facts of each case. Justice Brennan, author
of the majority opinion, stated:
It is reasonable to infer, from this absence of any textual iden-
tification of sorts of pattern that would satisfy § 1962's re-
quirement, in combination with the very relaxed limits to the
pattern concept fixed in § 1961(5), that Congress intended to
take a flexible approach, and envisaged that a pattern might be
demonstrated by reference to a range of different ordering prin-
ciples or relationships between predicates, within the expansive
bounds set. 76
76. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2900 (1989).
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Another reference to this type of flexible test is the statement that,
"[w]hether the predicates proved establish a threat of continued rack-
eteering activity depends on the specific facts of each case. Without
making any claim to cover the field of possibilities-preferring to deal
with this issue in the context of concrete factual situations presented
for decision-we offer some examples. . . ."" The mere giving of ex-
amples rather than a rule is evidence that it realized each case would
be dependent upon its specific facts and that no bright line could be
drawn.
The greatest support for the use of this multi-factored test is found
in the majority's statement that its decision cannot be made clear until
courts actually have to deal with the various situations which may arise.
Justice Brennan stated that the concepts of relatedness and continuity
forming a pattern "cannot be fixed in advance with such clarity that
it will always be apparent whether in a particular case a 'pattern of
racketeering activity' exists. The development of these concepts must
await future cases."9
7 8
Thus, it is apparent that the Supreme Court did not intend to do
away with the multiple factor test or it would have explicitly done so.
Considering the harsh penalties of RICO, courts should use their dis-
cretion in weighing the various factors to determine whether a pattern
of racketeering activity exists. This intermediate approach would ensure
that only the intended perpetrators are caught within the web of RICO.
The basic criticism of this test is its inherent unpredictability. Recognizing
this problem, the Seventh Circuit stated that "[a] test that depends on
a case-by-case analysis will necessarily be a bit rough around the edges
at first, but as courts begin to apply it to a greater number of factual
patterns, its contours should become clearer." '79
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court may have had the Seventh Circuit's quote in
mind when it rendered the H.J. Inc. opinion. Because the decision
implicitly encourages the use of the flexible approach, it is evident that
the Court wanted to send this new definition, along with a few examples,
to the district courts to see if a clear, uniform rule of law will emerge.
Although H.J. Inc. does not clearly define what constitutes a pattern
of racketeering activity in a manner useful to practitioners, it is clear
that the Court will continue to construe RICO broadly in accordance
with its expansive terms until congressional action is taken.
77. Id. at 2902.
78. Id.
79. Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d. 970, 977 (7th Cir. 1986).
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H.J. Inc. is suggesting to Congress that RICO needs to be redrafted
in a manner which embraces the flexible approach of using the totality
of a perpetrator's acts to decide if his activity creates a pattern of
racketeering activity. Until Congress acts, lower courts have two options:
they can continue on the same path of treading through the entanglement
and uncertainty of RICO, or they can construe H.J. Inc. to mean that
continuity plus relationship is dependent upon the specific facts each
case presents.
If Congress fails to act, it is possible RICO may be challenged by
a constitutional attack which, as Justice Scalia fears, the statute may
not be able to withstand.8 0 It would be in the nation's best interest for
Congress to act in an expedient manner in this situation. Otherwise,
the RICO statute may be struck down, leaving the justice system no
way to fight the organized criminal activity which infests our businesses
and costs our society so much.8 '
Dawn Theresa Trabeau
80. H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2909.
81. Before Congress now is a proposal to amend RICO which will severely limit the
damages available under the statute. A plaintiff will only be allowed treble damages if
the defendant had been convicted of a felony based on the same conduct. Most plaintiffs
will be limited to recovering actual damages. Punitive damages will be available in certain
consumer fraud cases under a clear and convincing standard, but the damages will be
limited to twice the actual damages. This proposal will restrict the number of civil RICO
cases, but it avoids the real problem with the statute: the definition of a "pattern of
racketeering activity." 136 Cong. Rec. S438 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1990).
1990] 1235

